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Abstract
Is corporate financial structure a determinant of non-price competitiveness in export mar-
kets? In this paper we provide a positive answer to this question by finding that among
illiquid exporters leverage is negatively correlated with the quality of their exported goods.
This result is obtained on a sample including over 120,000 export flows of 6,229 French
firms exporting within six HS6 products categories. The main methodological contribu-
tion of our study is the use of a flow-level measure of export quality obtained from the
estimation of a structural model of demand (Berry, 1994); this estimator enhance the
validity of our approach by avoiding the drawbacks of proxying for quality using export
prices, as it is common practice in the trade literature. We argue that the negative im-
pact of leverage on quality is consistent with theoretical contributions in the financial
literature predicting a negative impact of debt financing on firms’ incentive to undertake
quality upgrading investments.
1 Introduction
In contrast to the Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) a number of em-
pirical papers questions the irrelevance of the corporate financial structure for firms’ real
activities, by showing that leverage affects investment patterns and productivity growth (e.g.
Aivazian et al., 2005; Nucci et al., 2005; Nunes et al., 2007; Coricelli et al., 2012). These find-
ings from the financial literature are paralleled by the evidence emerging from studies on firms’
heterogeneous export performance. Models of export behavior in which credit constraints pre-
vent illiquid firms from sizing profitable export opportunities (Manova, 2008; Chaney, 2013),
have motivated several analyses on the role of firms’ financial attributes in determining export
entry and success on foreign markets (Greenaway et al., 2007; Bellone et al., 2010; Askenazy
et al., 2011; Minetti and Zhu, 2011). Although the direction of causality between firms’ ex-
port status and their financial attributes is a matter of debate, the conclusions of these papers
∗The authors would like to thank Stefano Schiavo, Jaanika Merikull, Lucia Tajoli, and all the participants
to the EACES and the ITSG workshops for their helpful comments and suggestions.
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suggest that firms’ liquidity and financial structure differ significantly between exporters and
non-exporters.
The supporters of the hypothesis that financial factors are determinants of firms heteroge-
nous export performance have generally interpreted high debt-to-asset ratios as an indication
of firms’ financial constraints. Since debt overhang is expected to impede firms’ ability to
access external funds, the negative impact of higher leverage on export entry is believed to
reflect the incapacity of highly leveraged firms to finance externally the fixed entry costs of
export. However, recent advancements in the trade literature suggest that in addition to the
capacity of paying for fixed entry costs, firms’ ability to produce higher quality products is an
important determinant of their selection into exporting and a major driver of their success in
foreign markets. Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) and Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) find convinc-
ing evidence that Mexican firms invest in quality upgrading in preparation to exporting, and
a series of papers using data on firm-level export flows find that exporters of more expensive
varieties reach more distant destinations and realize higher revenues (Bastos and Silva, 2010;
Crozet et al., 2011; Manova and Zhang, 2012). Hence, the relevance of financial factors for
firms’ export performance may be due to the fact that firms’ financial structure affects their
ability (or choice) to produce higher quality products.
This paper explores the finance-quality channel by investigating whether firms’ leverage
is a determinant of quality heterogeneity across exported varieties. Our hypothesis stems
from the predictions of models in the financial literature showing how firms’ recourse to
debt financing may eventually affect their costs and incentives to invest in quality enhancing
activities (Long and Malitz, 1985; Maksimovic and Titman, 1991). We base our empirical
analysis on firm-level export and and balance sheet data provided respectively by the French
Customs and by the French National Statistical Office (INSEE). These data are used to obtain
an estimator of quality for over 120,000 individual export flows, six HS6 consumer products,
and 6,229 French exporters. The novel result of this study is that leverage affects negatively
firms’ ability to compete on foreign market through quality. However, this result holds only
for ‘illiquid’ exporters, whose working capital is insufficient to cover all their operating costs.
This evidence signals that leverage has a differential impact on firms’ real activities depending
on whether debt financing is an optimizing choice for the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976),
or a forced solution to compensate for insufficient internal resources (Myers, 1984).
A major methodological contribution of our paper is that we adopt a discrete choice model
of consumer demand (Berry, 1994; Khandelwal, 2010) to estimate quality at the level of in-
dividual firms’ export flows. In the trade literature, price differences across similar products
have been used to identify differences in quality1. However, this strategy is not a viable alter-
1In turn, exported products’ prices are proxied by the unit-values of individual export flows, and unit-values
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native to study the impact of firms’ leverage on quality. If high leverage is both detrimental to
firms’ productivity and quality, its net effect on prices would be ambiguous: firms with higher
leverage may set relatively higher export prices because they are relatively less efficient. This
effect would be confounded as a sign of superior quality if we proxy quality with prices. Our
estimator of quality avoids this concern as it measures products’ demand left unexplained
by their relative prices. Arguably our results are based on a small sample drawn from of the
population of French exporters. This limitation of the study stems from methodological issues
related to the estimation of export quality. However, we show that the results obtained on the
small sample are consistent with some regularities between exporters’ financial characteristics
and export prices that emerge from the entire dataset of export flows.
Quality estimates are regressed on firms’ leverage and other firm-level covariates using
three different estimators that exploit different sources of variation in leverage and export
quality. First, we present estimates obtained from pooled OLS models that include a full
set of product-destination fixed effects. In these models, identification relies on variations
across firms exporting the same CN8 product to the same destination. Given the time-
persistence of leverage and quality (i.e. aspects such as branding are not expected to vary
greatly over time) this estimator would appear as the most appropriate. However, firm-level
omitted variables affecting financial structure and product quality are a major concern when
exploiting cross-sectional variations. To deal with this issue we check the robustness of the
results by adopting FE models and IV-FE models that control for firm-level time invariant
factors and simultaneity between leverage and quality. The significant negative relationship
between leverage and quality is robust to the use of different estimation techniques.
To the best of our knowledge the only other paper that investigates explicitly financial fac-
tors in relation to export quality is Fan et al. (2012). These authors present a model in which
credit rationing has an ambiguous effect on export prices, and they find that exporters based
in Chinese provinces with higher loans to GDP ratio export more expensive varieties, while
firms operating in 2-digit ISIC industries with higher financial dependence export cheaper
products. Methodologically, we distinguish our contribution from the work of these authors
by using a firm-level measure of leverage instead of industry- and regional-level regressors
that are more likely to capture structural differences across provinces and industries than
firm heterogeneity. In addition, although Fan et al. (2012) obtain a quality estimator similar
to the one that we use, our approach to the structural estimation of the discrete choice model
of demand differs from their one as we deal with endogeneity through IV, and as we allow the
demand parameters to vary across different HS6 product categories.
The rest of the paper is structured as it follows. Section 2 introduces the conceptual
are obtained by dividing the values of exported products by their quantities.
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framework underpinning our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, and it presents cursory
evidence on exporters’ attributes and exported varieties’ prices. Section 4 introduces the
methodology we adopt to obtain an estimator of quality. Section 5 presents the empirical
model of export quality and leverage and the main results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Conceptual framework
The Modigliani-Miller theorem states that firms’ financial structure is irrelevant for the value
of the firm (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). This proposition has been questioned by a large
theoretical literature that demonstrates how information asymmetries and imperfect capital
markets may affect firms’ access to different sources of external financing, their cost of capital
and ultimately their value. It follows, that the observed financial structure of the firm may
not be the one that optimizes its current and future profitability.
Myers and Majluf (1984) look into information asymmetries between insiders (i.e. manager
and current shareholders) and outsiders (i.e. potential buyers of firms’ shares) to explain the
observed pecking order pattern of firms’ financing; firms finance their expenses by first using
internal resources, when internal finance is insufficient they use debt, and as a last resort they
issue new equities. They show that if the real value of shares is private information of the
manager, it is in the interest of insiders to issue new shares only if the market valuation of the
firm is above its real value. By anticipating this behavior, the demand of outside investors
falls short of firms’ financing needs unless they expect shares to be issued in the absence of
less expensive sources of financing. This problem may oblige managers to finance investment
through debt, even if this source of financing does not lead to an optimal investment policy.
Indeed, in the absence of conflicting interests between managers and current shareholders,
Long and Malitz (1985) show how debt financing may cause underinvestment when investors
face uncertainty regarding the future ‘state of the world’. Investment increases firm’s revenues
in all ‘states of the world’. In ‘good states of the word’ the firm realizes sufficient revenues
to repay its debt and shareholders are residual claimants. On the contrary, in ‘bad states of
the word’ shareholders cede all the revenues of the firm as a partial repayment of its debt to
bondholders. Intuitively, if the manager acts in the interest of shareholders underinvestment
is determined by the different extent to which investment increases the expected returns for
shareholders and bondholders in the ‘bad states of the world’: bondholders benefit from in-
vestment as they might expect to recover a greater part of their loan, while shareholders do
not benefit at all. This asymmetry creates an incentive problem and causes more leveraged
firms to invest less than optimally. In addition, the distortion is accentuated if lenders antic-
ipate borrowers’ underinvestment and charge higher costs for credit because they expect to
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recover a smaller part of the loan in ‘bad states of the world’.
The paper of Long and Malitz provides an additional insight that leads to our hypothesis
of a negative effect of leverage on quality. Indeed, their model predicts that more firm-
specific intangible investment such as advertisement and R&D are more prone to agency
problems because lenders find it more difficult to monitor managers’ use of resources. Hence,
greater specificity implies higher ‘agency costs’ of debt. Therefore, they argue that firms
that resort more intensively to debt financing have a relative disadvantage in undertaking
intangible investment. They find empirical support for this prediction analyzing US firms’
patterns of investment and financing. Hence, this paper suggests that underinvestment due
to debt financing affects more seriously activities directly related with quality upgrading or
with consumers’ perception of product quality.
An alternative explanation for the negative relationship between leverage and quality is
provided by Maksimovic and Titman (1991). They present a model in which firms’ investment
in product quality is undertaken to build up a ‘reputation capital’ that allows to charge higher
prices in the future. High leverage increases the probability of future bankruptcy, and it
shortens firms’ optimization horizon. In turn, leverage causes lower present investment in
quality. In addition, highly leveraged firms that face an immediate threat of bankruptcy
may reduce quality (if this reduces costs) to sustain cash flow and pay back lenders. In the
words of the authors, this strategy of the firm is equivalent to “obtaining an involuntary loan
from consumers, since the reduction in future revenues resulting from the loss or reputation
corresponds to the repayment” (Maksimovic and Titman, 1991, pag. 117). By analyzing
inventory shortfalls as a measure of quality in the supermarket industry, Matsa (2011) brings
empirical support for this hypothesis, as he finds that highly leveraged firms degrade their
product quality (i.e. more frequent shortfalls) to preserve cash flow for debt servicing.
The literature that have been surveyed up to this point stresses the costs and distortions
introduced by debt financing, and the reasons why illiquid firms may be forced into adopting
a highly leveraged financial structure that constraints their investment behavior. However,
the ‘trade-off theory’ of corporate financial structure provides reasons why debt financing
could also enhance firms’ value. Debt financing may eventually increase investment if the tax
shield function of debt (i.e. the possibility of discounting interest rate payments from taxable
profits) increases the net present value of investment opportunities. Jensen and Meckling
(1976) also show how in the presence of conflicts between managers and owners, debt is a
‘disciplinary device’ through which owners control managers, because interest rate payments
reduce firms’ free cash-flow at the disposal of managers for unprofitable discretionary spending.
This insights suggests that for some firms high leverage is an optimal choice, and we should
not expect their competitiveness to be affected negatively by their levels of debt. Drawing
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from these theories, we expect that the relationship between leverage and quality would be
mediated by two opposite channels leading to the hypotheses that we test with French data:
Hyp 1: exporters with high levels of debt over total assets are relatively disadvantaged or
less incentivized in undertaking quality enhancing activities, and we expect them to
export worse quality varieties.
Hyp 2: For some firms the beneficial effects of debt offset the distortions induced by this
source of financing. For these firms a highly leveraged financial structure does not
necessarily affect product quality.
3 Data and general statistics
3.1 The FICUS and the Customs datasets
Our empirical analysis is conducted on data obtained from two sources: the Fichier complet
de Système Unifié de Statistique d’Entreprises (FICUS) provided by the French National
Statistical Office (INSEE), and the French Customs Dataset. FICUS reports balance sheet
items and demographic information, covering the population of French firms. We have access
to annual files relative to the period 1997-2007. After appending these files, the resulting
firm-year panel dataset includes over two million observations for the manufacturing sector.
Leverage of firm f at time t (Levft) is constructed using FICUS variables as the book value of
debt over total assets. FICUS includes also information on firms’ age, ownership, employment,
assets, liquidity and their need for external financing. We use these information to construct
firm-level controls. Outliers are eliminated by replacing to missing observations below the 1st
or above the 99th percentiles of each variable’s distribution.
The Custom database reports export values (euros), quantities (kilograms), destinations
and product classes (CN8) of the export flows of French firms. This dataset excludes the flows
of small exporters because firms that export less than e1,000 outside the EU, or less then
e100,000 within the EU, are not required to fill in a complete declarations of their transactions.
The different thresholds for reporting would be a problem if we were to investigate firms’
characteristics in relation to their export destinations. However, this is not a concern for our
identification strategy as we investigate differences across exporters serving the same market,
or variations in quality over time for the same exported variety defined at the firm-product-
destination level. Because some product categories change CN8 product code over time, we
use tables provided by Eurostat to concord the classification to the 2007 version.
Customs data are used to construct unit-values of exported varieties as flow values divided
by quantities UVfpd =
valfpd
qtyfpd
, where f , p, d are indices for firm, CN8 product and export
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destination. Unit-values are common proxy for prices in the literature despite numerous
flaws that have been exposed since the paper of Kravis and Lipsey (1971), and more recently
highlighted by Silver (2007). Caveats for using unit-values to compare the prices of different
varieties are particularly serious when products are weakly homogenous, nevertheless the
8-digit level of product disaggregation lessens this flaw. In addition, unit-values are very
noisy proxies for export prices because measurement errors in quantities determine extreme
variations. To mitigate this issue we drop observations outside the 0.5% extreme percentiles of
the unit-value distribution within each CN8 product category, and export flows with extreme
unit-value variations from one year to the following (above and below the 1% percentiles).
Unit-values and market shares of exported varieties are sufficient information to estimate
quality according to the methodology that is explained in the following sections.
A nice feature of the FICUS and the Customs datasets is that they both identify firms
through the same fiscal identification codes (SIREN). Therefore, we can associate individual
trade flows in Customs to the firm-level variables that we observe in FICUS, in order to
investigate the quality of exported varieties in relation to exporters’ attributes.
3.2 Some cursory evidence from the Customs dataset
Despite our analysis on export quality and leverage is conducted on a small sample of HS6
products, in this section we exploit the entire Customs dataset to obtain some stylized but
suggesting evidence on the relationship between exporters’ characteristics and quality. We
propose a simple empirical exercise that highlights some differences between firms exporting
varieties with different prices within the same HS6 product class.
First, each export flow is associated with a price quartile according to the position of its de-
meaned unit-value in the unit-value distribution of the corresponding HS6 product category2.
Firm-level variables listed in table 1 are then regressed on the set of dummies identifying
the different price quartiles. Results are reported in Table 2. Column 1 in the table reports
estimates for the constants. These estimates should be interpreted as the mean values of the
dependent variables (each firm-level indicator) when they are computed over the group of
firms exporting the cheapest varieties (first quartile of the price distribution). The remaining
columns show how the mean values of the dependent variables differ from the ones computed
on the first group, for firms exporting within the second (column 2), the third (column 3),
and the fourth (column 4) quartile of the price distribution
Firms exporting more expensive varieties are found to be older and larger in terms of
2Demeaned unit-values are obtained by subtracting to the unit-value of each variety the mean unit-value
computed over all varieties exported to the same destination in the same year within the same HS6 product
class.
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Table 1: Variables definition
Name Definition FICUS name
Age Firm age since the administrative creation date based on datcr
Employee Total Employment effsalm in thousand
Assets Sum of Tangible assets and untangible assets tactint
Cash Flow Gross Operating income over total assets ebe/TAa
Profit Profit before taxes over total assets pbcai/TA
Wage Average wage per employee saltrai / effsalm
Labor Productivity Value added over employees vaht / effsalm
Inv. Rate Tangible Physical Investment over total assets invcorp/TA
Inv. Rate Intangible Untangible Investment over total assets (invavap - invcorp) /TA
Collateral Tangible Assets over total assets immocor / TA
Intangible Intangible assets over total assets immoin /TA
Leverage Debt over total assets empdett / TA
Liquidity Cash minus need in cash over total assets (FDR - BFDR)/TA
a Variable is divided by the total assets of the previous year.
employment and total assets. They have also higher profitability and cash flows. They
distribute higher wages and display a larger labor productivity, and these differences are
stronger for firms exporting within the upper quartile. Their rates of tangible investment are
slightly and significantly lower, while they invest more in intangibles3. Consistently with our
hypothesis regarding a negative impact of leverage on quality we find that firms exporting
more expensive varieties have also lower levels of debt, higher cash flow but lower liquidity.
This evidence might signal that these firms generate more internal resources but have also
greater financing needs.
These descriptive statistics dismiss the hypothesis that higher prices are associated with
weaker exporters in terms of size, efficiency and financial attributes and they suggest that
quality matters more the cost-competitiveness for French exporters’ performance. In addi-
tion, the preliminary evidence on unit-values and firms’ leverage calls for a more formal test
on the relationship between exporters’ financial structure and export quality.
3Investment in intangibles includes advertising, R&D, software and market research.
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Table 2: Average value of firm-level variables conditional by quartiles of ex-
ported varieties’ unit-values
Constant Q2 Q3 Q4 Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 25.98*** 2.600*** 3.005*** 3.364*** 2,341,228
Employee 319.4*** 81.34*** 103.9*** 173.1*** 2,511,199
Assets 83184.5*** 31714.6*** 40966.7*** 71770.9*** 2,513,179
Cash Flow 0.108*** 0,000343 0.00101*** 0.00147*** 2,263,998
Profit 0.0941*** 0.00124*** 0.00216*** 0.00389*** 2,267,352
Wage 27.78*** 0.348*** 0.991*** 2.248*** 2,485,756
Labor prod. 58.37*** 1.657*** 3.223*** 6.212*** 2,485,823
Invest. rate intangible 0.00607*** -0.000577*** -0.000224*** 0.0000912** 2,275,653
Invest. rate tangible 0.0379*** -0.00210*** -0.00287*** -0.00296*** 2,283,284
Leverage 0.166*** -0.00232*** -0.00266*** -0.00379*** 2,290,526
Collateral 0.411*** -0.0136*** -0.0199*** -0.0286*** 2,592,876
Intangible Assets 0.0571*** -0.000611*** 0.000914*** 0.00334*** 2,290,468
Liquidity 0.0714*** -0.00310*** -0.00381*** -0.00433*** 2,187,555
HS6 product class fixed effects are included in each regression
4 The discrete choice model of demand
4.1 Theory
This section describes the discrete choice model of demand introduced by Berry (1994), and
how we obtain a proxy of export quality by estimating this model with French Customs data.
The central idea of this model consists in inverting the demand function so that to infer
from aggregate market information the mean utility level that each variety of a differentiated
product accrues to consumers. The model imposes some structure on demand by assuming
that each individual i consumes only the variety j that delivers the greatest utility:
uij > uik ∀ k ∈ K (1)
where K is a product class encompassing all varieties sharing some degree of substitutability.
The set K is composed by one or more ‘nests’, that are groups of varieties (indexed by g)
characterized by greater substitutability among each others4. To allow for the nested structure
4For example, K may include all varieties of men shirts on the market. Although consumers can always
substitute one variety for another inK, they are more likely to substitute shirts of the same material (belonging
to the same nest g within K).
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of K, consumers’ utility is modeled according to the following specification (Mcfadden, 1974):
uij = δj + ζig + (1− σ)ij , 0 ≤ σ < 1 (2)
δj = X
′
jβ + αpj + ζj , α ≤ 0
where δj is the expected utility from the consumption of j. This depends on vectors of prod-
uct attributes Xj and parameters β, on price pj and on product quality ζj . The terms ζig
and ij are consumers’ deviations from the mean utility δj that are determined respectively
by heterogeneous preferences across consumers for different nests of varieties, and across va-
rieties belonging to the same nest. The within-group substitutability parameter σ determines
the extent to which different consumers agree on the utility they derive from choosing j.
Eventually, the negative parameter α captures the disutility of price that is common across
consumers.
By assuming that idiosyncratic deviations in preferences ij follow a Type I extreme-value
distribution, utility function 2 originates the following nested logit model:
sj =
eδj/(1−σ)
[
∑
k∈g eδk/(1−σ)]σ ×
∑
g∈K [
∑
k∈g eδk/(1−σ)](1−σ)
(3)
where sj is the market share of variety j. This can be seen as the aggregate realization of
individual consumers’ choices, when the probability that consumer i chooses variety j over
any other alternative in K is increasing in the relative utility delivered by j compared to the
competing varieties. Berry shows that the log difference between sj and the market share so
of an outside variety can be conveniently written in a linear form5:
ln(sj)− ln(so) = X ′jβ + αpj + σln(sj/g) + ζj (4)
where ln(sj) − ln(so) is the normalized share of variety j measured over the total market of
product class K. On the contrary, the ‘nest share’ sj/g is the share of variety j measured over
the market for nest g to which that variety belongs. From the last equation we can obtain an
estimator of product quality Qj as:
Qj = [ln(sj)− ln(so)]− [αpj + σln(sj/g)] (5)
Qj ≡ X ′jβ + ζj
Equation 5 shows that an estimator of quality can be obtained as the normalized market share
of a variety that is not explained by its price and its nest-share. This residual component
is the part of demand for variety j that is accounted for by product characteristics (Xj),
5Ideally, the outside variety is a variety whose price and quality is uncorrelated with the price and quality
of the varieties whose market shares are normalized (Nevo, 2000).
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consumers’ taste (β) and a ‘brand’ component ζj . Admittedly, Qj should be given a broad
definition of quality encompassing different products’ aspects such as: closeness to consumers’
taste, quality of the materials, design and consumers’ appreciation for the brand. Nevertheless
this proxy fits our research question as we aim to determine whether firms’ leverage inhibits
activities such as market research, advertisement, product development that would allow them
to enhance their non-price competitiveness on foreign markets.
4.2 Identification strategy
We bring the model to the data by defining each export flow (fpd) observed in the Customs
dataset as an exported variety, and K as the set of all varieties that belong to the same
6-digit product class. Nests within K are groups of products belonging to the same 8-digit
product class. At time t the market share of each individual variety within a destination
market is defined as sfpdt =
qfpdt
MKTdt
, where the numerator is the exported quantity (in Kg)
of variety fpd, and MKTdt is the aggregate quantity demanded by consumers in country
d for all varieties belonging to the same 6-digit class. The nest share is defined instead as
nsfpdt =
qfpdt
MKTpdt
, where the denominator is the volume in market d of all varieties within the
same 8-digit class.
The empirical challenge in constructing market shares is determined by the unavailability
of data reporting total demand at the country-product level. To overcome this problem we
proxy for unobserved demand in each country with the aggregate quantity imported within
each 6-digit class. We use the BACI dataset6 to compute the outside varieties’ share Sodt.
This is the share on non-French import over the total import of country d in a given 6-digit
product class. This share is used to approximate market size: MKTdt =
∑
dt qfpdt
1−Sodt , where the
numerator is the total export from France to country d within a 6-digit product class obtained
by aggregating individual export flows7. Similarly we approximate market sizes at the 8-digit
level as MKTpdt =
∑
pdt qfpdt
1−Sodt , where the numerator is the aggregate quantity exported by
France to country d within the same 8-digit product class.
We estimate the model by individual 6-digit product classes to allow the coefficients α and
σ to differ acrossKs. The specification we adopt is similar to the one proposed by Khandelwal
(2010):
6This dataset reconciles trade declarations from importers and exporters as they appear in the COM-
TRADE database (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010).
7For example, if France exports to Italy 2,000 Kg of men shirts and its market share over Italy’s import
of men’s shirt is 0.2, then the share of non-French import in that product class is the outside variety’s share
So = 1− 0.2 = 0.8. The total market for shirts in Italy is computed as MKT = 2,000kg1−0.8 = 10, 000Kg.
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ln(sfpdt)− ln(sodt) = αUVfpdt + σln(nsfpdt) + δt + δc + Qˆfpdt (6)
Qˆfpdt ≡ δfpd + δfpdt
where UVfpdt is the unit-value of export flow fpd , and the error Qˆfpdt mirrors empirically
the quality estimator Qj in equation 5. This error can be decomposed into a firm-product-
destination fixed effect δfpd that absorbs the time-invariant features of the variety that affect
its market share in d (i.e. quality of materials, closeness with consumers’ taste, brand name),
and by a time-varying component δfpdt that captures shocks in demand reflecting the positive
impact of firms’ activities to promote their product on foreign markets (i.e. advertisement,
improvements in design and materials). Negative variations in δfpdt reflect instead the in-
capacity of firm f to keep the pace with quality upgrades that are implemented by French
exporters of competing varieties within the same market d. The remaining terms δt and
δd control respectively for macroeconomic shocks common to all French exporters and for
destination specific time-invariant factors.
If higher quality products are priced at higher mark-ups, or if their production involves
higher marginal costs, then Qˆfpdt is likely to be positive correlated with unit-values UVfpdt and
with the log of the nest-share ln(nsfpdt). Therefore, OLS estimates of α are generally upward
biased (Nevo, 2000). To deal with endogeneity in unit-values and nest-shares we estimate 6
adopting a panel fixed-effect instrumental variable estimator (IV-FE). With the panel unit
set at the level of the individual variety (fpd), within-group transformation eliminates the
correlation between the regressors and the fixed-effect component of quality δfpd, and in turn
prevents omitted variable bias of the estimated parameters. Identification of α and σ now
relies only on time-variations in market shares and prices within the same variety.
To deal with the endogeneity of prices and nest-shares arising from their correlation with
the time-varying component of quality, we use three instruments. The first instrument for
UVfpdt is the average unit-value computed across all French varieties exported to d at time
t within the same 6-digit product class of p. We expect this instrument to be mainly driven
by demand factors in the destination market unrelated with firm-specific variations in fpdt.
The second instrument for prices is the physical productivity of the firm, obtained as output
quantity per employee8. Since the physical productivity of labor does not depend on prices
we expect this instrument to be exogenous with respect to quality variations but to be cor-
related with unit-values through marginal costs. Lastly, we instrument for market shares of
8Because we observe only the total quantity exported by the firm qexp we obtain quantities produced qtot
as: qtot = vtotvexp ×qexp. We lag the instrument to avoid measurement error in quantities to drive the correlation
between unit-values and the instrument.
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individual firms using the number of different 8-digit products exported by the same firm to
d (Khandelwal, 2010).
The methodological requirements and the assumptions of the discrete choice of demand
prevent us from estimating the discrete choice model for all 6-digit product categories observed
in the Customs dataset. First, the assumptions of this model are less tenable if applied to
the demand for intermediates and capital goods. Importers of these products are less likely
to choose in each period among alternative varieties because factors such as longer-lasting
contracts with suppliers and technological path dependency may constraint their ability to
switch variety. For this reason we choose to restrict our analysis to consumer products.
Second, in order to obtain more precise estimates of the demand parameters we select HS6
products for which we have a sufficiently large number of observations in Customs9. Lastly,
we keep HS6 products for which the over-identification tests and the coefficients obtained
from estimating the model by FE-IV suggest correct identification of the demand parameters.
Table 3: Demand parameters (FE estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Chocolate and Wine Wine Perfume and Wooden Lamps
confectionery (still) (sparkling) toilet waters furniture
α -0.017∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.006∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
σ 0.788∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗ 0.946∗∗∗ 0.987∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
??????????.. ???????.. ?
R2 0.70 0.89 0.89 0.93 0.90 0.80
Obs. 17,390 18,737 29,502 54,598 37,474 14,339
On the basis of these criteria we select six product categories that are economically relevant
over the total French exports of consumer goods. These products fit our investigation on
quality, as their demand is likely to be determined by exporters’ capacity to carry out ‘quality
enhancing’ activities such as: researching consumers’ taste in foreign markets, improving
packaging and product design, adopting better materials, switching to quality enhancing
production techniques, investing in advertisement to promote their brand.
Estimates of the demand parameters from FE and IV-FE are respectively reported in Table
3 and Table 4. As expected, across all products the coefficient α from IV-FE is consistently
9In addition, some product categories cannot be analyzed because for some years they miss information on
quantities.
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Table 4: Demand parameters (IV-FE estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Chocolate and Wine Wine Perfume and Wooden Lamps
confectionery (still) (sparkling) toilet waters furniture
α -0.088∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
σ 0.852∗∗∗ 0.913∗∗∗ 0.977∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.22) (0.06) (0.10) (0.04) (0.07)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Own-price elasticities
Median -4.88 -1.16 -0.62 -1.02 -6.81 -0.36
High -8.36 -1.51 -1.16 -1.65 -12.60 -0.76
Low -3.03 -0.55 -4.27 -0.60 -3.53 -0.19
Hansen j-test (p-value) 0.24 0.24 0.46 0.40 0.67 0.23
R2 0.68 0.88 0.90 0.73 0.89 0.82
Obs. 8,971 10,809 13,079 28,187 14,833 4,984
Notes. The reported estimates are obtained by IV-FE estimation of the discrete choice model, imple-
mented by using the user-written command xtreg2 in Stata (Schaffer, 2005). For all product categories
we instrument for unit-values and nested-shares using the same set of instruments as described in the
body of the text. Cluster robust standard errors are reported (cluster unit: product-destination).
smaller than the one from FE, suggesting that the IV estimator corrects the upward bias due
to the positive correlation of unit-value with unobserved quality. The substitution parameters
σ obtained from IV are all in the plausible range [0− 1). Overidentification tests confirm the
exogeneity of our instrument set. Table 4 reports also the price elasticities of market shares
that are computed using the estimated demand parameters, prices and the market shares of
individual varieties10.
5 Leverage end export quality
5.1 The model of leverage and export quality
In this section we discuss how we identify the effect of exporters’ leverage on quality by dealing
with omitted variable bias and endogeneity. Our simple specification of the model of leverage
and export quality is:
Qˆfpdt = cpdt + βLevft + Z
′
ftγ + ηf + ηft + fpdt (7)
10Further details on how own-price elasticities are computed are left in the Appendix.
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where cpdt accounts for shocks in demand that affect all firms exporting the same product
to the same destination. This term is important for identification because the estimator of
quality is basically the residual market share of an exported variety once we control for its
price, therefore it is affected by destination-product specific demand shocks. The term ηf
and ηft capture unobservable fixed and time-varying factors at the firm level. Z ′ft is a vector
of observable firm-level controls. This vector includes: the log number of workers, labor
productivity (value added per employee), the log of firm’s age and two dummy that assumes
value one if the exporter belongs to a business group or if it is foreign-owned. These covariates
are included to increase the efficiency of the estimates and to control for observable factors
that might affect both firms’ financing decisions and the quality of their exported varieties.
For example, older firms may have easier access to credit and be perceived as producers of
better quality products because of their longer track records and their well established brand
name. Firms that are part of a business group may have lower leverage due to greater access
to groups’ internal financing (Boutin et al., 2012), and at the same time they may benefit
from quality enhancing activities carried out by other affiliates.
Pooled OLS with cluster robust standard errors is the first estimator we apply to model
7. By including a full set of product-destination-year dummies, we force identification to rely
on variations in quality and leverage across firms exporting the same product to the same
destination. These variations are the most appropriate source of identification according to
our research question. Indeed, we want to investigate whether differences in financial structure
across firms determine differences in exported quality. In addition, Levft and Qˆfpdt are time-
persistent variables hence we expect estimators that exploit time variations to underestimate
the impact of leverage on quality. However, OLS would generate consistent estimates of β
only if leverage is uncorrelated with ηf and ηft. Because this assumption is very restrictive
we will also regress the model using within-group FE and IV-FE estimators.
Within-group FE transforms the variables in 7 to eliminate ηf from the right-hand side
of the model11. By doing so, we prevent the correlation between leverage and some firm-level
time-invariant factors subsumed in the error to bias the coefficient on Levft. However FE
models are still insufficient to address the endogeneity of Levft arising from its correlation
with firm-level shocks affecting both its financial structure and the quality of its export.
In addition, endogeneity might arise from reverse causality if firms modify their financial
structure as the result of an increase in revenues from foreign markets. We address this issue
by using IV-FE models to instrument current variations in leverage with past variations in
exporters’ financial structure.
11All variables are demeaned at the level of each panel group, where groups are defined at the level of
individual varieties (fpd).
15
Table 5: Summary statistics of the estimation sample
HS6 Obs. Firms Employees Leverage Liquidity lprod Intangibles UV Flows Dest.
180690 7893 456 203.24 0.20 0.05 3.83 0.12 13.35 5.33 3.67
220410 14042 553 87.33 0.28 -0.01 4.27 0.06 10.15 11.68 8.10
220421 16921 674 169.79 0.23 0.02 4.02 0.07 7.83 5.70 3.43
330300 48376 1114 234.74 0.18 0.02 4.04 0.18 33.41 13.54 10.89
940360 31562 3256 156.07 0.17 0.05 3.66 0.12 20.04 3.53 2.98
940510 7174 706 242.69 0.14 0.06 3.78 0.16 78.08 3.01 2.67
Notes. HS6 product categories are: Chocolate and confectionery (180690), Still wine (220410), Sparkling wine
(220421), Perfume and toilet waters (330300), Wooden furniture (940360), Lamps (940510). Obs. is the total
number of export flows observed, Firms is the number of unique exporters in the sample, Employee is the mean
number of employees by exporter, Leverage is the average book vale to total asset ratio, Liquidity is the difference
between firms’ working capital and financing need to cover operating expenses normalized over total assets , lprod is
the log of labor productivity defined as value added per employee, Intangibles is the ratio of intangible assets over
total assets, UV is the mean unit-value of exported varieties, Flows is the average number of export flows by firm
(product-destination), Dest is the average number of unique destinations served by exporter.
5.2 Results
To maximize the number of observations we estimate the discrete choice model of demand
with export flows generated by both manufacturers and wholesalers. However, we investigate
the impact of leverage on quality only for the exports of manufacturing firms. This choice
is explained by the fact that the theoretical literature that motivates our investigation is not
easily applicable to wholesalers; it is not clear which kind of quality enhancing investment
could be affected by the financial structure of these firms. Table 5 reports summary statistics
on exporters’ attributes and export flows by each product category.
Leverage differs significantly across firms exporting different products. Exporters of per-
fumes (HS6: 330300), lamps (HS6: 940510) and wooden furniture (HS6: 940360) are charac-
terized by lower levels of debt-to-asset ratio, larger size and higher proportion of intangibles
over total assets. These product classes have also higher average unit-value indicating that
they include the most expensive varieties in our sample. On the contrary, exporters of wines
(HS6: 220410 and 220421) are characterized by higher leverage, smaller size and lower ratio
of intangibles over total assets. This cursory evidence appears consistent with the theoretical
predictions of Long and Malitz (1985) whereby firms with a greater proportion of ‘opaque’ as-
sets are relatively disadvantaged in financing investment through debt. The table reports also
exporters’ average liquidity obtained as the difference between working capital and financing
needs for operating expenses (normalized over total assets). This variable indicates firms’
operative dependence on external financing. Exporters of wine and perfumes appear more
reliant on external financing to cover operative expenses. However differences in liquidity
across product categories are smaller than differences in leverage, suggesting that heterogene-
ity in financial structure across exporters of different products might be mostly determined
by different patterns of investment financing rather than by different operative dependence
on credit.
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In figure 1 we show kernel densities of Qˆ estimated by individual 6-digit product cate-
gories. For each product class we plot empirical densities estimated on the split sample of
exporters with low leverage (Levft < 0.31) and exporters with high leverage (Levft > 0.36)12.
Differences in the distribution of Qˆ between ‘high leverage’ and ‘low leverage’ exporters are
apparent for three out of the six product categories in our sample13. The distribution of Qˆ
for low-leverage firms appears shifted toward higher values when we consider the export of
Perfume, Sparkling Wine and Lamps. For other products empirical differences in the distri-
bution of Qˆ are less apparent. This evidence calls for more formal tests on the relationship
between exporters leverage and exported varieties’ quality.
The results from the estimation of model 7 are reported in table 6. We first regress the
model using the whole sample obtained by pooling together observations for each HS6 product
category. Then, estimation is repeated separately on the samples of export flows generated
by firms with Liquidity > 0 and with Liquidity < 0. A similar split sample strategy is also
implemented in Nucci et al. (2005), with the aim of capturing the differential effect of leverage
on TFP for firms that are able to finance productivity enhancing opportunities with own funds
and those that require external financing. These authors find indeed that the effect of leverage
on total factor productivity is more negative for firms with low liquidity, confirming that higher
levels of debt constraint firms ability to undertake performance enhancing activities.
In addition, this separation criteria allows to partially discriminate those firm that choose
a highly leveraged financial structure by balancing costs and benefit of debt financing (trade
off theory of optimal capital structure), from those that accumulate debt in the absence of
sufficient liquidity to finance operating expenses and investment internally (pecking order
theory). Indeed if a firm is left with sufficient internal resources to cover the costs of current
operations after investing (Liquidityft > 0), either it does not need external financing at
all or it uses external financing to finance investment when it could always substitute if for
some internal financing. Hence the use of debt financing for these firms can be explained
be the beneficial effects of debt (e.g. tax shield ). On the contrary when working capital is
insufficient to cover operating expenses (Liquidity < 0), debt financing is more likely to be a
forced solution rather than a value optimizing choice.
Results obtained on the whole sample confirm Hyp1 that leverage impacts negatively
on the quality of firms’ export. The coefficients on Levft range from -0.066 (FE) to -0.188
(IV-FE). The upward bias of the FE estimator might be due to the fact that for some firms
12We split the sample using the threshold above which leverage has been found to affect negatively TFP
growth (Coricelli et al., 2012).
13However the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject equality of distributions only for Chocolate and
confectionery (HS6:180690).
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Figure 1: Distributions of Qˆ by group of exporters with different leverage
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Notes. All densities are estimated using the Epanechnikov kernel function. Bandwith are selected automatically by Stata (kdensity
command). The threshold levels of leverage that we use to split samples are motivated by Coricelli et al. (2012).
quality upgrading investment is financed by debt. Hence in these cases leverage and quality
move in the same direction. However, we are interested in the effect of higher initial levels of
leverage on firms ability to increase the quality of their exported products. For this reason
OLS and IV-FE estimates are more relevant for our research question. OLS gives implicitly
more weight to differences in levels of leverage across exporters, while IV-FE addresses reverse
causality that biases upward FE estimates by instrumenting changes in leverage at time t with
lagged changes (i.e. we use the first and the second lags as instruments). The IV-FE estimates
obtained on the whole sample is significant only at the 10% level. Weak significance casts
some doubts on the fact that the impact of leverage on quality is negative for all firms.
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Table 6: Export quality and firms’ financial characteristics
Pooled Sample Liquidity>0 Liquidity<0
OLS FE IV-FE OLS FE IV-FE OLS FE IV-FE
Levft -0.131
∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗ -0.188∗ -0.029 -0.044 0.309∗ -0.242∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.828∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.028) (0.108) (0.032) (0.040) (0.163) (0.031) (0.047) (0.273)
log(Intang)ft 0.011
∗∗∗ 0.004 0.058∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.014∗ 0.011
(0.002) (0.005) (0.019) (0.003) (0.006) (0.027) (0.003) (0.008) (0.032)
log(lprod)ft 0.173
∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.026∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.008) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015)
log(empl)ft 0.064
∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.012) (0.020) (0.009) (0.016) (0.027) (0.008) (0.022) (0.034)
Groupft -0.037
∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.019 -0.056∗∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.024 -0.013 0.037∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.020) (0.011) (0.012) (0.026)
Foreignft 0.057
∗∗∗ -0.019 -0.030 0.030 -0.043∗ -0.078∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.039) (0.024) (0.020) (0.040)
log(age)ft -0.000 -0.160
∗ -0.198∗∗ 0.000 -0.172∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.156 -0.206
(0.000) (0.086) (0.095) (0.000) (0.087) (0.081) (0.000) (0.105) (0.152)
Constant -0.954∗∗∗ -0.938∗∗∗ -0.837∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.102) (0.085)
pd FE y n n y n n y n n
hs6-t FE y y y y y y y y y
fpd FE n y y n y y n y y
Hansen (p) - - 0.818 - - 0.024 - - 0.706
R2 0.597 0.005 0.003 0.577 0.004 0.002 0.647 0.003 -0.012
Groups 15,654 6,956 10,146 4581.000 7,354 3,255
Obs. 85,335 72,227 32,292 52,001 41,274 19,154 33,334 25,821 10,945
Notes. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster unit: product-destination). IV-FE models are estimated by GMM
using the first and the second lags of the endogenous variables (Levft, log(Intang)ft, log(lprod)ft) as instruments. IV-FE models
are estimated using the xtivreg2 (Schaffer, 2005). R2 for FE and IV-FE models are reported but they are not correct as they do
not exclude the part of the model that is explained by individuals’ FEs, therefore they should be not interpret as reliable measure
of goodness of fit of the model. pdFE are CN8 product-destination fixed effects, hs6 − tFE are HS6 product-year fixed effects,
fpdFE are firm-CN8 product-destination FE. Except for the latter group of FE controlled for by within-group transformation of
the variables, the other two FE are introduced in the model by a full set of dummies.
Estimates from the split samples of liquid and illiquid firms provide a much clearer picture.
Leverage is found affecting negatively and significantly the export quality of illiquid firms
only. This evidence supports the validity of our second hypothesis (Hyp2). When we look
at firms with insufficient internal resources to finance operations, the coefficients on Levft
are consistently more negative than those obtained on the whole sample and they are all
significant at the 1% level across different estimators. On the contrary, leverage does not
appear to reduce quality for firms with sufficient internal liquidity. Hence, we conclude that
debt financing constraint firms’ ability (or incentive) to compete through quality on foreign
markets only when exporters’ financial structure does not depend on their choice but on
insufficient internal liquidity.
The estimated coefficients on some of our control variables deserve also some discussion.
Larger and more productive exporters (with higher log(empl)ft and log(lprod)ft) are found
associated with the export of higher quality varieties across all specifications. This result is
in line with the evidence documenting positive correlation between output price and firms’
size (Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012). Therefore, our analysis based on a theoretically grounded
estimator of quality, confirms the hypothesis advanced in previous papers that there is com-
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plementarity between firms’ scale, productivity and quality. In addition, consistently with
the idea that investment in intangible assets contribute to the real or perceived quality of
exporters’ good, we find that log(Intang)ft is positively correlated with export quality, al-
though this relationship does not hold for illiquid firms. A tentative interpretation of this
result could be that intangible assets of liquidity constrained firms are less related with the
quality of their products.
In FE and IV-FE models, the coefficients on the dummy variables Groupft and Foreignft
are identified by firms that become part of a business group or by those that are acquired by a
foreign owner during the period of our analysis. Coefficient on Groupft are inconsistent across
different estimators and samples, and we prefer not to advance any interpretation on the effect
of entrance in a business group for output quality. On the contrary, foreign acquisition seems
having a positive impact on export quality only for firms with negative liquidity while the
effect is ambiguous when estimated on the whole sample and on the group of liquid exporters.
Lastly, contrary with our expectations on the effect of firms’ longevity on brand strength,
we find the log of firm age (log(age)ft) to be negatively correlated with quality when the
coefficient is obtained on the whole sample.
Table 7: Export price and firms’ financial characteristics
Pooled Sample Liquidity>0 Liquidity<0
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Levft 0.018 -0.070
∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ -0.063∗ -0.152 -0.167∗∗∗ -0.053 -0.499∗∗
(0.031) (0.022) (0.087) (0.037) (0.038) (0.119) (0.041) (0.034) (0.243)
log(Intang)ft 0.055
∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.026
(0.002) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004) (0.014) (0.003) (0.006) (0.024)
log(lprod)ft -0.010 0.011
∗∗ 0.005 -0.003 0.030∗∗∗ 0.014 -0.024∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.016∗
(0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
log(empl)ft -0.025
∗∗ 0.004 -0.032∗∗ -0.025∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.023∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.020) (0.009) (0.014) (0.025)
Groupft -0.051
∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.007 -0.087∗∗∗ 0.007 0.010 -0.002 -0.010 0.002
(0.018) (0.008) (0.012) (0.021) (0.010) (0.016) (0.021) (0.013) (0.023)
Foreignft 0.024 -0.004 -0.022 -0.069
∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.066∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ -0.018 0.024
(0.023) (0.012) (0.018) (0.026) (0.016) (0.028) (0.027) (0.018) (0.034)
log(age)ft 0.004
∗∗∗ -0.026 -0.068 0.006∗∗∗ -0.060 -0.053 0.002∗∗∗ 0.032 -0.050
(0.000) (0.040) (0.052) (0.000) (0.048) (0.081) (0.000) (0.049) (0.053)
Constant 2.362∗∗∗ 2.321∗∗∗ 2.425∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.085) (0.078)
pd FE y n n y n n y n n
HS6-Year FE y y y y y y y y y
fpd FE n y y n y y n y y
Hansen (p) 0.640 0.189 0.872
R2 0.468 0.001 0.001 0.464 0.004 0.005 0.498 0.002 -0.008
Groups 16,482 7,254 10,733 4,805 7,777 3,406
Obs. 90,717 77,021 34,111 55,427 44,187 20,286 35,290 27,495 11,547
Notes. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster unit: product-destination). IV-FE models are estimated by GMM
using the first and the second lags of the endogenous variables (Levft, log(Intang)ft, log(lprod)ft) as instruments. IV-FE models
are estimated using the xtivreg2 (Schaffer, 2005). R2 for FE and IV-FE models are reported but they are not correct as they do
not exclude the part of the model that is explained by individuals’ FEs, therefore they should be not interpret as reliable measure
of goodness of fit of the model. pdFE are CN8 product-destination fixed effects, hs6 − tFE are HS6 product-year fixed effects,
fpdFE are firm-CN8 product-destination FE. Except for the latter group of FE controlled for by within-group transformation of
the variables, the other two FE are introduced in the model by a full set of dummies.
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As a robustness check we repeat the estimation of 7 by replacing Qˆft with unit-values on
the left-hand side of the model. As we previously mentioned, the effect of leverage on unit-
values is ambiguous if more leveraged exporters are less capable to implement productivity
enhancing measures as suggested by the financial literature. However, the results obtained
on Qˆft still hold by using unit-values as the dependent variable. We find that exporters with
higher debt-to-assets ratio export less expensive varieties. In support of the differential effect
of leverage on quality for liquid and illiquid firms we also find that the negative coefficient of
leverage on price is significantly different from zero only on the sample of illiquid exporters.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we provide empirical support to the hypothesis that firms’ financial structure
is a relevant element to explain differences in product quality across exporters. Given the
importance of product quality for export performance, our results shed also light on the rela-
tionship between financial factors, firms selection into exporting and performance in foreign
markets. Our results are obtained by analyzing a panel of 6,229 exporters associated with
over 120,000 export flows for six HS6 digit product categories of consumer goods.
Product quality for illiquid exporters is found degrading in their level of debt over total
assets. The same is not true for liquid exporters. We interpret the negative impact of leverage
on quality as an empirical confirmation of models predicting that debt financing and financial
distress reduce firms’ incentive and ability to invest in quality enhancing activities such as
advertisement and R&D (Long and Malitz, 1985; Maksimovic and Titman, 1991). Instead, we
interpret the conditionality of this effect on firms’ liquidity, by referring to alternative theories
of firms’ financial structure. We believe that the pecking-order theory of firms’ financing is
more appropriate to explain high levels of debt among illiquid exporters: as the incapacity of
these firms to cover operating expenses is an indication that they resort to debt financing in
absence of sufficient internal resources Myers and Majluf (1984). For these firms high levels
of debt are less likely to be set on the basis of a value optimizing choice, and leverage is more
likely to constraint their quality upgrading activities. On the contrary, liquid firms use debt in
substitution to available internal resources. Therefore, high levels of observed leverage among
these firms is better explained by a value optimizing choice, and it is less likely to constraints
quality upgrading if this would brings value to the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
We believe that our results have some important policy implications as they suggest that
policies affecting firms’ levels of debt financing (e.g. changes in corporate taxation rates)
may also affect indirectly firms’ incentives to upgrade their product quality. Again, our
results may reveal some advantage of market based financial systems in promoting exporters’
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quality-competitiveness on foreign markets.
Appendix
Table 8: Correlations between the main variables used in regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Qˆfpdt 1
(2) log(UV )fpdt 0.0246
∗∗∗ 1
(3) Levft -0.0362
∗∗∗ -0.0998∗∗∗ 1
(4) log(Intang)ft 0.0659
∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ -0.0749∗∗∗ 1
(5) log(empl)ft 0.0770
∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗ 1
(6) log(age)ft 0.00671
∗ 0.0376∗∗∗ 0.0206∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 1
(7) Group -0.0122∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.00730∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 1
(8) Foreignft 0.0373
∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ -0.0533∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ -0.0172∗∗∗ -0.390∗∗∗ 1
(9) log(lprod)ft 0.0581
∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.0810∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Derivation of the elasticity of demand
By defining Dg =
∑
j∈g e
δj/1−6 equation (3) can be written as:
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eδj/(1−σ)
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g ]
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(9)
because ∂δj∂pj =
α
1−σ , we can use the definition of sj in (8) and the definition of Pj/g ≡ sj/g in
(6) to write (9) as:
∂sj
∂pj
=
α
1− σsj(1− σsj|g − (1− σ)sj) (10)
then multiplying (10) by pjsj we obtain the formula for the market share elasticity of demand:
∂sj
∂pj
× pj
sj
=
α
1− σpj(1− σsj|g − (1− σ)sj) (11)
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